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Abstract
This study examines the effects of an unfavorable political event or environmental hostility, namely,
a blockade affecting international tourist inﬂows, and how tourism market diversiﬁcation (TMD)
could mitigate the adverse effects in the case of Qatar. To quantify these effects, we adopted a
standard tourism-demand model and augmented it with a Herﬁndahl index (HI) for the geographical
diversiﬁcation of tourism exports, a dummy variable for the blockade, and an interaction variable.
We further analyzed the tourist inﬂows from various regions using regional dummies and their
interaction terms to capture the different impacts of the blockade on Qatar’s inbound tourists from
46 source countries between 2006 and 2019. This study applied a panel-based differenced systemgeneralized method-of-moments estimation to reveal several interesting ﬁndings. First, there was a
signiﬁcant positive individual effect of TMD on inbound tourism. Second, during the blockade, Qatar
witnessed growing tourist inﬂows from Asia and Australasia, the Americas, and Europe. However,
the incident inevitably placed severe constraints on some tourist ﬂows to Qatar, primarily from
Middle Eastern and African countries. Moreover, although the HI has a positive impact on tourism
growth, our study revealed that the interaction terms between the HI and the blockade are only
statistically signiﬁcant in some cases, implying that a diversiﬁcation strategy cannot completely
mitigate the harmful effects of a blockade on tourism due to the severity of blockade effect.
Nevertheless, a TMD strategy appears to be successful at the individual level.
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Introduction
A growing body of literature suggests that international tourism can bring numerous beneﬁts, such
as infrastructure development, job creation, foreign exchange revenue, poverty alleviation, positive
spillover effects for other industries, and greater overall economic growth (Saha et al., 2021).
Despite its apparent advantages, however, international tourism is highly volatile and susceptible to
unfavorable sociopolitical developments and environmental hostilities, such as the blockade of
Qatar, the current COVID-19 pandemic, and unforeseen economic shocks like the recent ﬁnancial
crisis (Timothy, 2013; Zhang et al., 2021). This instability in the demand for tourism can impede the
development of the sector and present risks for investors, who naturally desire returns from their
investments in this sector (Issa and Altinay, 2006). What is more, when the tourism sector experiences a sharp, prolonged decline in international arrivals, the consequences can be particularly
devastating. The reduced demand for tourism products and services not only affects the current local
economy but also the long-term earnings prospects from tourism (Abdelkader, 2017). Policymakers
therefore need to consider innovative strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of unfavorable social,
economic, and political developments on the demand for tourism, such as tourism market diversiﬁcation (TMD).
In particular, unprecedented events, such as political sanctions and blockades, can increase the
loss of tourism revenue when a destination depends heavily on the country or countries applying the
sanctions for its tourism inﬂows. Market diversiﬁcation is therefore crucial in tourism for two
reasons: First, it identiﬁes potential new markets to target (Dundas and Richardson, 1980), and
second, diversifying the target markets helps to minimize uncertainties resulting from external
environmental conditions, such as adverse demand shocks and political threats (Rumelt, 1974).
However, implementing a TMD strategy can be costly, so an unsuccessful diversiﬁcation strategy
can waste considerable ﬁnancial resources (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1990; O’Brien et al., 2014). ATMD
strategy therefore needs to be carefully assessed, particularly with regard to whether contingent
events, such as major economic or political crises, could make it a desirable approach for achieving
long-term growth (Ansoff, 1957). One way to investigate market diversiﬁcation is to collect information about foreign demand (Lejarraga and Walkenhorst, 2009) by exploring the travel patterns
of potential tourist markets when an unfavorable event arises.
This study makes a signiﬁcant contribution by examining whether diversiﬁcation of tourism
markets can help minimize the adverse effects of geopolitical events on a country’s tourism industry.
The current study presents two innovative research methods: The ﬁrst introduces a Herﬁndahl index
(HI) score for the geographical diversiﬁcation of tourism exports to measure how diversiﬁed a
destination’s tourism markets are, while the second augments a tourism-demand model that was
proposed in the tourism literature (e.g., Dogru et al., 2017). Furthermore, this study proposes two
augmented tourism-demand models: The ﬁrst incorporates the individual effects of the HI and
blockade on tourism demand and their interaction term (i.e., where the HI is multiplied by the
blockade). The primary purpose of incorporating this interaction variable is to investigate whether
TMD could sustain tourism growth during the blockade. To identify the effect of TMD further, the
second model included regional dummy variables to estimate the economic loss of tourism demand
resulting from the incident and identify geographical regions that saw the most growth in visitor
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numbers and revenue during the blockade. The main objective for this regional analysis is to
understand how the political event impacted inbound tourists from particular regions. This current
study took Qatar, which was blockaded by other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries
between June 2017 and January 2021, as its case for studying whether TMD could mitigate the
adverse impact of a blockade, thus helping to increase the sector’s resilience to future shocks. The
tourist inﬂows from 46 countries of origin to Qatar over the 2006–2019 period are examined using a
panel-based differenced system-generalized method-of-moment (SYS-GMM) approach.
The following section reviews the relevant literature and develops hypotheses about the
blockade, tourism demand, and tourism market diversiﬁcation. This is followed by sections describing the empirical methodology and results followed by the study’s conclusion.

Literature review and hypotheses development
The blockade and tourism demand
Tourism is susceptible to external shocks from unfavorable sociopolitical and economic events (see
Issa and Altinay, 2006; Farmaki et al., 2015; Abdelkader, 2017; Saha and Yap, 2014; Saha et al.,
2021). One such event is the imposition of strict travel visa requirements, which according to
Neumayer (2006), is mainly done to protect national security interests. However, such policies have
a detrimental effect on the international tourism industry. For instance, Song et al. (2012) and Li and
Song (2013) quantiﬁed the effects of China’s strict visa restrictions on the country’s inbound tourism
using a standard tourism-demand model, and they observed a signiﬁcant economic loss and a
decline in international tourist arrivals. Similarly, Neumayer (2006) developed a gravity-type model
to estimate the loss in bilateral travel between two countries due to visa restrictions between 1995
and 2005 and discovered that on average, there was a 52% and 63% reduction in international visitor
numbers and receipts, respectively.
Another common geopolitical tactic used by governments is to introduce sanctions or a blockade
on a particular country. Sanctions often bring economic hardship for that country in order to pressure
its government to concede to the demands of the sanctioning states (Allen, 2008). In this sense,
sanctions and blockades are associated with, and contribute to, environmental hostility. Environmental hostility at both the micro and macro levels can render a ﬁrm, or even an entire industry/
sector or economy, vulnerable (Ndubisi et al., 2020). A hostile environment refers to an external
dimension that poses a threat to a ﬁrm’s viability and performance, and it is characterized by intense
levels of competition, a precarious industry setting, a harsh business climate, and a lack of external
opportunities (Covin and Slevin, 1989). Political sanctions and blockades can create a hostile
environment for a tourism sector by portraying the sanctioned destination as a precarious tourism
destination, thus causing a drop in tourism arrivals and revenues, which in turn creates a harsh
business climate for tourism-related businesses within the sanctioned country. Organizations are
open systems that are vulnerable to inﬂuences in their external environment (Scott and Davis, 2007),
particularly when it is hostile (Ndubisi et al., 2020). Other scholars have considered environmental
hostility in terms of risk, change, and competitive behavior (Lofsten and Lindelof, 2005), but it was
Miller (1987) who ﬁrst linked ﬁrm strategy to the management of environmental hostility, arguing
that there should be relationships between a strategy and unfavorable environmental dimensions,
which in this case, are tourism diversiﬁcation strategy and environmental hostility in the form of the
blockade, respectively.
In the tourism literature, Seyﬁ and Hall (2020) investigated the complex relationship between
sanctions and tourism through a scoping review, and their ﬁndings revealed that sanctions can
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severely affect international tourism through restrictions on international ﬂights and disruptions to
ﬁnancial investment and supply chains from the countries applying the sanctions. Pratt and Alizadeh
(2018) performed a computable general equilibrium analysis to estimate the cost of the sanctions on
Iran, and they discovered that the country lost its international competitiveness, especially when the
initiating countries tightened their visa requirements for travel to Iran. Furthermore, tourism
businesses are unlikely to quickly rebound after the sanctions have been lifted (Pratt and Alizadeh,
2018). It is therefore clear that hostile political measures like blockades and sanctions can have
serious negative consequences for the international tourism sector of the targeted country.
Political events inevitably present risks to the international travel market, so it is worth exploring
to what extent a political crisis, such as a blockade or sanction, may impede tourism development in
an impacted country. The literature has mostly focused on scoping reviews of such political incidents and tourism development, but there seems to be a lack of empirical research that quantitatively measures the consequences of a blockade on the affected destination. Based on the
literature discussed above, we developed the ﬁrst hypothesis:
H1: Political events, such as blockades, can directly lower international tourism demand in the
affected destination.

The blockade and tourism market diversiﬁcation
Tourism market diversiﬁcation is deﬁned as a business strategy for a tourist destination to secure
sustainable tourism revenue by venturing into new or emerging markets (Can and Gozgor, 2018).
Factors such as shifting political and international trends, increasing competition, and improvements in business performance are key reasons for any organization to diversify its business
(Ansoff, 1957). In addition, the international trade literature provides general support for promoting
a market diversiﬁcation strategy because it helps sustain a country’s export earnings and allows
businesses to access broader markets and provide a wider variety of products and services (Ahmed
et al., 2013).
Unfavorable political events cause uncertainty in the demand for international tourism, so an
increasing focus on the diversity of a country’s tourism market is crucial to improving its resilience.
Moreover, if tourists mainly arrive from just a few core nations, the host country is especially
susceptible to shocks and political crises in those core nations, resulting in reduced tourism revenue
(Can and Gozgor, 2018). Therefore, the only way for an affected country to mitigate the effects of
such a shock to its tourism sector is to diversify into other international tourist markets in friendly
nations (Seyﬁ and Hall, 2019; 2020). According to Shepherd (2010), diversifying export markets
can serve two main purposes: (i) It minimizes the risk of relying solely on a particular trading region
and (ii) it helps sustain a stable income stream, thus positively contributing to economic growth.
Thus, for a destination, especially one that is heavily dependent on tourism revenue, it should
diversify its target tourist markets to reduce the uncertainty (Zigern-Korn and Kol, 2018).
When a country experiences political tensions with certain nations, it is logical for the government to seek to diversify its tourism markets by promoting itself as a destination for other trading
partners who have no direct involvement in the current political dispute. One example of this is
Russia, where political sanctions from the United States, Australia, Canada, and the European
Union countries have adversely affected tourist arrivals (Rastorguev et al., 2018). Based on
comparative analysis and expert evaluations, Rastorguev et al. (2018) found that incoming tourists
to Russia had declined signiﬁcantly, but the country witnessed an increase in the “real tourist”
inﬂows from nations like China and Israel, which did not participate in the international sanctions
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against Russia. Another example is Palestine, where Israel has consistently blocked its tourism
development plans by withdrawing tour operators’ licenses, withholding approvals for new hotels,
and deterring training for Arab guides (Isaac, 2010). Surprisingly, while the number of Israeli
tourists to Palestine declined by 33% between 1999 and 2000, the number of international tourists
from Poland, Italy, and Japan increased by 96%, 76%, and 79%, respectively (Isaac, 2010).
Two studies in the tourism literature have found that TMD can lead to sustainable tourism
development. First, Can and Gozgor (2018) developed a Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index for the
market diversiﬁcation of tourist arrivals to eight countries in the Mediterranean region. They used
the index to investigate the relationship between market diversiﬁcation and economic growth, thus
conﬁrming that TMD contributes to economic growth, particularly for tourism-oriented countries.
Second, Jang and Chen (2008) studied TMD in Taiwan by applying the principles of ﬁnancial
portfolio theory to identify the optimal tourist market mix. They concluded that Taiwan relies
heavily on Japanese tourists, so a downturn in this dominant tourism market in terms of lower tourist
arrivals could impact its economic performance. Therefore, the authors stressed that for Taiwan to
minimize this risk of tourism revenue losses, the government should diversify its marketing
strategies to other stable tourism markets.
The literature has highlighted the importance of TMD, but any quantiﬁcation of how TMD can
mitigate the harmful impacts of political events on tourism is somewhat non-existent. We accordingly constructed the second hypothesis:
H2: Tourism market diversiﬁcation can mitigate a loss in tourist arrivals and revenue due to a
blockade or political sanction.

Empirical methodology
Tourism in Qatar
Qatar has positioned its tourism sector as being key to diversifying the country’s economy.
However, despite the country’s tourism development ambitions, the industry encountered a substantial setback with the imposition of a blockade in 2017. The signiﬁcant reduction in tourist
arrivals due to the blockade can also be seen in Figure 1. However, Figure 2 shows how the average
number of tourists from three regions grew during the 2017–2019 blockade period. In particular, the
proportion of tourists from Asia rose from 22% in 2016 to 38% in 2019.
In the current paper, we modiﬁed the HI score suggested by Hinlo and Arranguez (2017) for the
case of Qatar. The HI score measures the geographical diversiﬁcation of tourism exports, and this is
calculated as
2
N 
X
xit,Qatar
HIQatar,t ¼ 1 
XQatar,t
i¼1
where xi,Qatar is the total value of tourism exports to trade partner i from Qatar in year t, while XQatar,t
is the total tourism exports of Qatar in year t. In this research, we use tourist arrivals and international
tourism expenditure as indicators of tourism exports. The degree of geographical diversiﬁcation is
based on the HI score, and this varies between 0 and 1. A score greater than 0.99 indicates the
industry is highly diversiﬁed. If it falls between 0.85 and 0.99, the industry is un-concentrated or
diversiﬁed, and it is moderately diversiﬁed if the score is between 0.75 and 0.85. If the score is lower
than 0.75, the industry is not diversiﬁed. The HI for Qatar’s tourism exports, as shown in Figure 3,
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Figure 1. International tourist arrivals and tourist expenditure in Qatar. Source: Euromonitor.

Figure 2. Average tourist arrivals before and after the blockade by region. Source: Own calculation based on
Euromonitor dataset.

reveals that the industry can be considered diversiﬁed. The lowest score occurred in 2016, but in
2017, the score increased remarkably, indicating that the country diversiﬁed its international tourist
markets following the blockade.

Empirical models and estimation methods
This research examines whether TMD could help mitigate the adverse effects of geopolitical events
on a country’s tourism sector. We developed two augmented tourism-demand models presented
below.
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Figure 3. Herﬁndahl index (HI) score based on Qatar’s tourist arrivals and international tourism expenditure
between 2006 and 2019. Source: Own calculations.

Augmented tourism-demand model 1:.


TDit ¼ f TDit1 ,RGDPPCit ,RPEXit ,SPEXit , CPR∗it , blockadei , Dummy 2016i ,HIt , blockadei × HIt
(1)
Augmented tourism-demand model 2:
TDit ¼ f ðTDit1 , RGDPPCit , RPEXit , SPEXit , CPR∗it , blockadei , Dummy 2016i , Asia Australasia
America, Africa, Europe, Asia Australasia × blockadei , America
×blockadei , Africa × blockadei , Europe × blockadei Þ
(2)
where TD is the international demand for Qatari tourism in country of origin i at time t. TDit1 is a
lagged dependent variable at a time lag of one in order to capture habit persistence and repeat visits
by international travelers (Dogru and Sirakaya-Turk, 2018). RGDPPC is the real gross domestic
product per capita (RGDPPC) in country of origin i at time t. RPEX represents the relative prices
between Qatar (RPEX) and country of origin i adjusted for the exchange rate. SPEXit signiﬁes the
relative substitute prices between Qatar (SPEX) and its competing destinations, standardized according to exchange rates. CPR∗it is the relative perception of corruption between Qatar and country
of origin i. Blockade is a dummy variable to represent the blockade of Qatar. Dummy2016i represents the year 2016 in order to capture the period of greatest growth for tourist arrivals. HIt is the
Herﬁndahl index for the geographical diversiﬁcation of tourism exports. The interaction term
blockadei × HIt measures the effect of HI on tourism demand during the blockade. Asia Australasia,
America, Africa, and Europe are dummy variables for tourists originating from those respective
regions. The interaction variables Asia Australasia × blockadei America × blockadei ,
Africa × blockadei , and Europe × blockadei measure the effects of the blockade on tourist arrivals to
Qatar from various regions around the world.
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In the augmented tourism-demand model 1, the HI is used as a proxy variable for TMD, so both
HI and blockadei × HIt are the variables of interest for measuring the impact of TMD on tourism
demand. However, a limitation of this approach is that the HI only provides a general measurement
of tourism market diversiﬁcation, and it does not speciﬁcally identify the tourist markets that are
diversiﬁed. Furthermore, it does not shed light on how individual markets performed during the
blockade. Hence, we created regional dummy variables by separating the tourism data by continent
to observe the interactions with each region and thus identify the individual effects of the blockade.
The main motivation behind these regional interaction variables was to disaggregate the blockade’s
effects on demand for Qatar’s international tourism by region. The regional dummy variables were
AsiaAustralasia, Europe, Africa, and America, while the regional interaction variables were
AsiaAustralasia × blockade, Europe × blockade, Africa × blockade, and America × blockade.
Despite our best efforts to include as many relevant explanatory variables as possible, it was not
feasible to accommodate every single aspect due to the relatively small size of the time-series panel.
To ensure consistency in the statistical analysis, we adopted differenced system GMM for this
research because according to Roodman (2009), differenced system GMM provides better estimations for small T and large N panels. Roodman (2009) also highlighted several advantages to
using differenced system GMM: First, the estimators can be dynamic, meaning that GMM allows
for lagged dependent variables in the estimation process. Second, estimations modify the standard
error of idiosyncratic errors, which may feature heteroscedasticity and serial correlation, using a
two-step variance-estimation process. The GMM method not only reduces bias in estimations—it
also increases the robustness of the standard errors. Furthermore, it allows the regressors to be
endogenous.
Our augmented tourism-demand equations (1) and (2) can be expressed (in ﬁrst-difference
natural logarithms) as follows
ΔlnðTDit Þ¼αΔlnðTDit1 Þþβ1;0 ΔlnðGDPPCit Þþβ1;1 ΔlnðGDPPCit1 Þþβ2;0 ΔlnðRPEXit Þ


þβ2;1 ΔlnðRPEXit1 Þþβ3;0 ΔlnðSPEXit Þþβ3;1 lnðSPEXit1 Þþβ4;0 Δln CPR∗it


þβ4;1 Δln CPR∗it1 þβ5 Dummy2016i þβ6 blockadei þβ7 lnHIt

(3)

þβ8 blockadei ×lnHIt þεit
ΔlnðTDit Þ ¼αΔlnðTDit1 Þ þ β1;0 ΔlnðGDPPCit Þ þ β1;1 ΔlnðGDPPCit1 Þ þ β2;0 ΔlnðRPEXit Þ


þ β2;1 ΔlnðRPEXit1 Þ þ β3;0 ΔlnðSPEXit Þ þ β3;1 lnðSPEXit1 Þ þ β4;0 Δln CPR∗it


þ β4;1 Δln CPR∗it1 þ β5 Dummy 2016i þ β6 blockadei þ β7 Asia Australasia
þ β8 Africa þ β9 America þ β10 Europe þ β11 Asia Australasia × blockadei
þ β12 Africa × blockadei þ β13 America × blockadei þ β14 Europe × blockadei þ εit
(4)
where Δ denotes the ﬁrst-difference operator and εit ¼ μi þ vit and Eðμi Þ ¼ Eðvit Þ ¼ Eðμi vit Þ ¼ 0.
The disturbance term comprises the ﬁxed-effects ðμi Þ and the idiosyncratic error ðvit Þ. Both μi and vit
are assumed to be uncorrelated. Even though the dependent variable is now speciﬁed at the differenced level, Roodman (2009) asserted that differenced system GMM estimators allow for independent variables that do not need to be strictly exogenous. In the current models, we
incorporated lagged independent variables to reﬂect tourists’ continued awareness of Qatar because
tourists tend to make travel decisions based on their past experiences of a destination’s
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characteristics, living costs, and income (Shan and Wilson, 2001). Due to our small panel size, it was
impossible to include too many lags in the estimation, so the maximum lag was therefore set to 1 to
avoid singularity. In other words, the estimation procedure permitted lags of independent variables,
so we incorporated one lag for all the independent variables, excluding the dummy variables.
The interaction term in equation (3) measures the extent to which diversiﬁcation can mitigate the
loss of tourism resulting from the blockade. The marginal effects of TMD on tourism growth can be
explained as follows
(
∂ΔlnðTDit Þ
β7 þ β8 , if blockade ¼ 1
¼
β7 ,
if blockade ¼ 0
∂ln HIt
Furthermore, the interaction terms in equation (4) reﬂect how tourist arrivals from the considered
regions could help minimize the negative inﬂuences of the unprecedented political event. If one of
the interaction terms is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, the relevant region could be considered
a potential market for TMD in Qatar. Meanwhile, the effects of the blockade on the expected change
in tourism demand by region could be measured as
8
>
>
>
if
blockade ¼ 1, Asia Australasia ¼ 1
>
> β6 þ β11 ,
∂ΔlnðTDit Þ < β6 þ β12 ,
if blockade ¼ 1, Africa ¼ 1
(5)
¼
if
blockade ¼ 1, America ¼ 1
β6 þ β13 ,
∂blockadei >
>
>
>
if
blockade ¼ 1, Europe ¼ 1
>
: β6 þ β14
For instance, the effect of the blockade on international tourist arrivals from Asia and Australasia
was β6 þ β11 . We could further analyze the net gain for an individual region before and after the
blockade. For instance, based on equation (6), the net gain from the growth in European tourists was
β14 , which is its interaction term.
(
∂ΔlnðTDit Þ
β10 þ β14 , if blockade ¼ 1
¼
(6)
β10 ,
if blockade ¼ 0
∂Europei
Furthermore, from equation (4), assuming that all economic variables remain unchanged, we can
show that equation (7) demonstrates the average growth in tourist arrivals coming from each
respective region during the blockade
8
>
>
> β6 þ β7 þ β11 ,
if blockade ¼ 1, Asia Australasia ¼ 1
>
>
<
β6 þ β8 þ β12 ,
if blockade ¼ 1, Africa ¼ 1
EfΔlnðTDit Þg ¼
(7)
if
blockade ¼ 1, America ¼ 1
β
þ
β
þ
β
,
>
6
9
13
>
>
>
if blockade ¼ 1, Europe ¼ 1
>
: β6 þ β10 þ β14
To check robustness, we used maximum likelihood estimation of random-effects models (Breusch,
1987) to test the validity of the tourism-demand models. Hausman tests were also carried out to
determine appropriate linear panel data models for the current study. Note that robustness testing has
been widely used in the economics and tourism literature, such as by Saha and Sen (2020) and Saha
and Yap (2015).
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Data description
The augmented tourism-demand models include the following key economic indicators: tourists’
incomes, relative prices between the countries of origin and destination, substitute prices, and habitpersistence effects (Dogru et al., 2017; Song and Wong, 2008). We also constructed a dummy
variable for the blockade, which was one between 2017 and 2019 and zero before 2016, to represent
the years in which the blockade was, and was not, in place. In addition, international tourism
ﬂourished in Qatar in 2016, with it welcoming 2.9 million visitors, but this number plummeted to
2.14 million by 2019, following the blockade’s imposition. We therefore introduced the dummy
variable Dummy2016, which was set at one for 2016 and zero for other years, to indicate the peak
year for tourist arrivals before the decline began in 2017.
Price variables, relative prices, and substitute prices have been widely used in the literature. Akis
(1998) and Dogru et al. (2017) have suggested that relative prices should be standardized according
to the exchange rate to reﬂect tourists’ relative purchasing power when visiting a destination.
Relative prices were therefore adjusted for the exchange rate (RPEX), and this can be expressed as
RPEXit ¼

CPIQatar, t
ðCPIi,t Þ × ERi,t

where CPI is the consumer price index, and ER is the ratio of QAR (the Qatari riyal) to country i’s
currency. If country i has a higher consumer price index than Qatar, its inﬂation rate is expected to be
higher, so its currency would normally depreciate against the QAR. In this case, country i’s RPEX
would be low, indicating that its people have less purchasing power in Qatar than they do in their
home country. For substitute prices, Dogru et al. (2017) and Martin and Witt (1988) posited that this
variable can be measured by adding together all the ratios of competing destinations’ CPI to the
original country’s CPI. By then multiplying the sum of this ratio by an equally weighted average and
standardizing it using the bilateral exchange rate between Qatar and the country of origin, we get the
expression shown below
CPIQatar, t

SPEXit ¼ 
CPI1,t
CPIi,t



CPIj,t
CPI3,t
2,t
100%
þ CPI
þ
þ
…
þ
×
× ERi,t
j
CPIi,t
CPIi,t
CPIi,t

where j is the number of competing destinations.
According to Nazmfar et al. (2019), Qatar faces strong competition from Egypt, Jordan, the
United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, all of which have an established presence in
international tourism. In this research, we consider them to be Qatar’s main competing destinations
for three reasons: First, these destinations are geographically close to Qatar, and second, their
cultural and religious practices are similar. Third, these countries, excluding Turkey, also have rather
similar physical (e.g., mosques) and environmental (e.g., weather) conditions.
This study also incorporated perceived corruption into the model as an origin–destination
characteristic variable. Corruption perception is an essential indicator for capturing the institutional
aspects of a country, as has been mentioned in the tourism-demand literature (Saha and Yap, 2015;
Poprawe, 2015). Saha and Yap (2015), for example, argued that corruption is often rife in developing countries because state policymakers control resource mobility and preside over local and
regional tourism-development planning. In contrast, limiting corruption promotes competition and
gives entrepreneurs the economic freedom to pursue business activities (Saha and Sen, 2020). In
other words, a low level of corruption helps businesses to ﬂourish, and prices are reduced through
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increased competition. It is therefore vital to explore the effects of corruption on Qatar’s international tourism, especially as Qatar’s corruption perception ranking (CPR) is relatively low, being
ranked 30 out of 180 in 2020,1 although corruption in the country is recognized as a risk for
international tourists (Nair, 2013).
However, including an absolute measure of CPR for Qatar may not accurately reﬂect how Qatar’s
level of corruption really inﬂuences the choices of international travelers when considering Qatar as
a travel destination. Uriely (2005) argued that the concept of relative truth should be emphasized in
tourism research. Positioning this within the context of economic modeling for tourism, it is perhaps
more appropriate to consider the relative differences between Qatar’s CPR and those of the various
countries of origin in this research because this could help explore whether such differences play a
signiﬁcant role in the demand for Qatari tourism. Thus, the CPR variable used in this study was
based on a relative measure, which can be speciﬁed as follows
CPR∗it ¼

CPRQatar,t
CPRi,t

A higher CPR∗it value indicates that tourists from country i perceive Qatar to be relatively more
corrupt than their own nation and vice versa.
Secondary data were acquired from various international institutions, such as Euromonitor
International, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank. In this study, two types of data
were used as proxies for tourism demand: the number of international tourist arrivals (TA) and
international tourists’ expenditure (TE) in Qatar. The data were based on an unbalanced yearly panel
of 549 observations with 46 countries of origin from 2006 to 2019. All the explanatory variables,
except for the dummy variables, were transformed into natural logarithms, so the coefﬁcients could
be interpreted in the form of elasticities. The descriptions for the independent variables and their
expected coefﬁcient signs can be found in the Supplemental ﬁle.
Before conducting the panel data analysis, the variables needed to be shown to follow a stationary process to avoid the issue of spurious regression. This research therefore adopted the test
statistic of Im et al. (2003) because it allows individual processes to vary across the cross-section.
The null hypothesis is that the variables contain a unit root.
Table 1 presents the results of the unit root test, with the ﬁndings being mixed. The variables
lnTA, lnTE, lnGDPPC, and lnRPEX contain unit roots, while the rest do not. The ﬁrst-differenced
data for lnTA, lnTE, lnGDPPC, and lnRPEX were shown to be stationary, so they could be used for
regression analysis without any spurious regression. Meanwhile, the lnSPEX and lnCPR variables
were stationary, and we used their ﬁrst-differenced data so that any interpretation of the coefﬁcients
would be consistent with the other variables, with the ﬁrst-differenced variables representing growth
rates. Furthermore, the study used lnHI level data to measure the impact of the current level of
diversiﬁcation on tourism growth.

Empirical results
The ﬁndings for Models A and C, as shown in Tables 2 and 3, reveal that the blockade variable has
the expected negative sign at a high signiﬁcance level (1%), supporting our ﬁrst hypothesis that the
imposition of a blockade on a country can deter international tourist inﬂows. In other words, the
blockade constrained inﬂows of visitors from nearby countries, which in turn signiﬁcantly decreased the overall number of tourist arrivals. Similarly, this adverse effect of the blockade persisted
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Table 1. Results of Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root test.
Level

Without trend

With trend

First-differenced

Without trend

With trend

lnTA
lnTE
lnGDPPC
lnRPEX
lnSPEX
lnCPR
lnHI_TA
lnHI_TE

3.572***
5.705
5.015
0.867
2.348**
3.689***
3.139***
11.039***

4.192
0.912
3.557***
3.286***
8.351***
5.309***
3.325***
11.004***

ΔlnTA
ΔlnTE
ΔlnGDPPC
ΔlnRPEX
ΔlnSPEX
ΔLNCPR*
ΔlnHI_TA
ΔlnHI_TE

9.323***
7.329***
8.750***
7.722***
12.437***
9.683***
11.351***
14.239***

14.066***
7.094***
9.798***
7.400***
11.543***
10.481***
11.872***
14.286***

Notes: lnTA, lnTE, lnGDPPC, lnRPEX, lnSPEX, and lnCPR represent the natural logarithm of tourist arrivals, tourist expenditure, gross domestic product, relative price adjusted with exchange rates, substitute prices adjusted with exchange
rates, and relative corruption perception ranking, respectively. lnHI_TA and lnHI_TE represent the natural logarithm of
Herﬁndahl index using tourist arrival and inbound tourism expenditure data, respectively. Δ denotes the ﬁrst-differenced
operator. All variables are speciﬁed in natural logarithms. The test was based on z-statistics. *,**, and *** denote signiﬁcance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

and retained its level of signiﬁcance when the regional dummies analysis was conducted, as shown
in Tables 4 and 5.
The HI coefﬁcients are positive and highly signiﬁcant, indicating that the more diversiﬁed
tourism markets are, the greater the number of tourist arrivals and tourism revenue. This result is
consistent with the study of Can and Gozgor (2018), who found that tourism market diversiﬁcation
led to tourism growth in Egypt and Greece.
Furthermore, the interaction terms for the HI and the blockade in models B and D have positive
signs, implying that diversiﬁcation led to tourism growth in Qatar during the blockade. Nevertheless, the adverse effects of the blockade presented a serious impediment to the progress of
tourism market diversiﬁcation. Our study shows that the interaction term for the HI and the blockade
is only highly signiﬁcant for both tourist arrivals and inbound tourism expenditure when the
maximum likelihood estimation of the random-effects model is used, while the coefﬁcient is insigniﬁcant for the GMM panel data estimations. There is therefore some evidence to support our
second hypothesis that TMD presents a means of overcoming the crisis in terms of tourism growth.
In other words, TMD may not be fully effective due to the powerful negative effects of the blockade.
Indeed, the damaging effects of the incident were so severe that TMD could not signiﬁcantly
mitigate their negative impacts.
This result is consistent with the fact that not all tourists will be able to evade the negative impacts
of a blockade, despite the Qatari government implementing strategies to diversify its tourism
markets. According to BBC News (19 July 2017), countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE,
Bahrain, and Egypt closed their airspace to Qatari aircraft during the blockade, forcing Qatar
Airways to cancel its ﬂights to 18 regional cities. With these airspace restrictions, Qatar Airways
was unable to transport many international travelers to Qatar.
Next, we identiﬁed the regions that could generate tourism growth during the blockade. The
results in Tables 4 and 5 show that the coefﬁcients for the Asia and Australasia, Europe, and
the Americas variables were positive, so they had signiﬁcant effects on Qatari tourism, despite the
blockade coefﬁcient remaining negative and highly signiﬁcant. Furthermore, the interaction effects
of the regional dummies with the blockade (Model G) are positive (0.0876 and 0.1638, respectively,
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Table 2. Empirical analysis of Herﬁndahl index and its moderation effects.

LDV
Δ lnGDPPCit
Δ lnGDPPCit-1
Δ lnRPEXit
Δ lnRPEXit-1
Δ lnSPEXit
Δ lnSPEXit-1
Δ lnCPRit
Δ lnCPRit-1
lnHIt
Dummy_2016
Blockade
Blockade x lnHI
Wald chi-square
statistics (p-value)
ArellanoBond test
for zero
autocorrelation
order 1 (p-value)
ArellanoBond test
for zero
autocorrelation
order 2 (p-value)
Sargan test of
overidentiﬁcation
restrictions (pvalue)
Hansen test of
overidentiﬁcation
restrictions (pvalue)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist
arrivals (ΔlnTA)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist
expenditure (ΔlnTE)

Model A (exclude
interaction effects)

Model B (include
interaction effects)

Model C (exclude
interaction effects

Model D (include
interaction effects)

0.1635
0.3829
0.0974
0.0461
0.0903
0.1066
0.0624
0.0051
0.2014
3.4525
0.3153
0.3072

0.1900
0.3560
0.1119
0.0170
0.0919
0.0709
0.0144
0.0011
0.1829
3.1954
0.5576
0.1583
5.1455
154.33

0.1858
0.2984
0.2216
0.7220
1.5203
0.1852
0.7061
0.5054
0.4082
31.6312
0.4856
0.4452

0.1619
0.2606
0.1936
0.6787
0.1562
0.1562
0.6722
0.5199
0.3985
28.6051
0.5408
0.0431
6.6001
92.88

(0.0455)***
(0.2600)
(0.2251)
(0.1066)
(0.1329)
(0.0903)
(0.0865)
(0.0376)
(0.0405)***
(0.5346)***
(0.0301)***
(0.0163)***

82.89 (0.000)

(0.0597)**
(0.2633)
(0.2306)
(0.1051)
(0.1293)
(0.1015)
(0.0687)
(0.0376)
(0.0444)***
(0.5556)***
(0.1876)***
(0.3909)
(4.2129)
(0.000)

(0.0522)***
(0.4905)
(0.4399)
(0.2905)**
(0.4053)***
(0.2331)
(0.2479)***
(0.0911)***
(0.0682)***
(3.4981)***
(0.0646)***
(0.0205)***

73.45 (0.000)

(0.0526)***
(0.4796)
(0.4356)
(0.2793)**
(0.2359)
(0.2359)
(0.2476)***
(0.0923)***
(0.0668)***
(3.6480)***
(0.0897)***
(0.3674)
(5.9471)
(0.000)

5.27 (0.000)

4.49 (0.000)

5.26 (0.000)

5.24 (0.000)

1.36 (0.173)

1.79 (0.074)

0.01 (0.994)

0.04 (0.969)

227.30 (0.959)

249.44 (0.746)

237.10 (0.873)

241.07 (0.819)

42.05 (1.000)

40.96 (1.000)

42.19 (1.000)

40.96 (1.000)

Note: ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. LDV = one-period lagged dependent variable;
ΔlnGDPPC = differenced log gross domestic product per capita; Δ lnRPEX = differenced log relative prices standardized by
exchange rates; Δ lnSPEX = differenced log substitute prices standardized by exchange rates; Δ lnCPR = differenced log
relative corruption perception ranking; Blockade = dummy variable for blockade. lnHI = log Herﬁndahl index. Δ denotes the
ﬁrst-differenced operator. Number of observations = 549. Number of cross-sectional groups = 46. Number of time-series =
10. Coefﬁcients' standard errors are shown in brackets. The estimation model is system GMM dynamic panel data estimation
with robust standard errors. The estimation procedure follows common correlated effects estimation of heterogeneous
dynamic panel models developed by Cuaresmaa et al. (2008). “Half-panel” jackknife correction is adopted to avoid small
sample bias.
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Table 3. Robustness check of Herﬁndahl index and its interaction effect using maximum likelihood estimation
of random-effects models.

Δ lnGDPPCit
Δ lnGDPPCit-1
Δ lnRPEXit
Δ lnRPEXit-1
Δ lnSPEXit
Δ lnSPEXit-1
Δ lnCPRit
Δ lnCPRit-1
lnHIt
Dummy_2016
Blockade
Blockade x
lnHI
R-squared
F-test of
overall
signiﬁcance
(p-value)
Hausman test
(p-value)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist
arrivals (ΔlnTA)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist
expenditure (ΔlnTE)

Model A (exclude
interaction effects)

Model C (exclude
interaction effects

1.2096
0.3529
0.1791
0.0563
0.2231
0.3275
0.0446
0.1284
2.6244
0.2573
0.2417

Model B (include
interaction effects)

Model D (include
interaction effects)

(0.2058)***
1.1715 (0.2039)***
1.4052 (0.3355)***
1.3362 (0.3312)***
(0.2013)*
0.3686 (0.1992)*
0.1513 (0.3292)
0.1747 (0.3246)
(0.0893)** 0.2087 (0.0887)**
0.3162 (0.1403)**
0.2218 (0.1403)
(0.0893)
0.0358 (0.0885)
0.7878 (0.1428)*** 0.8688 (0.1422)***
(0.0611)***
0.2545 (0.0611)***
0.1113 (0.0999)
0.1642 (0.0994)*
(0.0529)*** 0.3651 (0.0534)***
0.2216 (0.0821)***
0.1494 (0.0829)*
(0.0289)
0.0444 (0.0287)
0.4889 (0.0458)***
0.4879 (0.0452)***
(0.0262)***
0.1049 (0.0267)***
0.3545 (0.0423)***
0.3065 (0.0434)***
(0.4735)***
2.2026 (0.4829)*** 23.6338 (2.2258)*** 16.7656 (2.7722)***
(0.0337)***
0.6687 (0.1195)***
0.3536 (0.0524)***
0.5617 (0.0729)***
(0.0151)***
0.5643 (0.2253)** 0.4059 (0.0275)***
0.8436 (0.3093)***
8.8198 (2.4596)***
20.5707 (5.0729)***

0.4336
411.05 (0.000)

8.91 (0.63)

0.4468
432.98 (0.000)

0.4597
456.80 (0.000)

9.49 (0.661)

20.53 (0.039)

0.4757
486.38 (0.000)

17.62 (0.1278)

ΔlnGDPPC = differenced log gross domestic product per capita; ΔlnRPEX = differenced log relative prices standardized by
exchange rates; ΔlnSPEX = differenced log substitute prices standardized by exchange rates; ΔlnCPR = differenced log
relative corruption perception ranking; Blockade = dummy variable for blockade. LnHt = log Herﬁndahl Index.
Δ denotes ﬁrst-difference operator. Number of observations = 549. Number of cross-sectional groups = 46. Number of
time-series = 11. The F-test of overall signiﬁcance examines the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients. The null hypothesis of the
F-test is that all coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant. Hausman test analyses the differences between the ﬁxed-effects and randomeffect coefﬁcients. The null hypothesis of Hausman test states that the difference in coefﬁcients is not systematic. If the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected, random-effect model will be chosen. If the null hypothesis is rejected, ﬁxed-effect model will
be selected. Coefﬁcients' standard errors are shown in brackets.
Note: ***, ** and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

in Table 4) and signiﬁcant at the 5% and 1% levels of signiﬁcance for Europe and the Americas,
indicating a net gain in tourist arrivals from these regions before and after the blockade.
In addition, the positive coefﬁcients of the regional dummy variables represent the interaction
between the blockade and each region, and they suggest that tourism market diversiﬁcation into less
politically hostile regions like Europe and the Americas could enhance the sustainability of Qatar’s
tourism industry. According to Appendix Table A1, Qatar has approved approximately 95 countries
around the world, but mainly located in Europe and the Americas, for either 90 days visa-free travel,
30 days visa-free travel, or travel with an instant one-trip visa. Thanks to Qatar relaxing its tourist
visa policies, the number of visa-free tourists from Europe increased from 133,875 in 2017 to

LDV
ΔlnGDPPCit
ΔlnGDPPCit-1
ΔlnRPEXit
ΔlnRPEXit-1
ΔlnSPEXit
ΔlnSPEXit-1
ΔlnCPRit
ΔlnCPRit-1
Dummy_2016
Blockade
Asia_Australasia
Europe
Africa
America
Asia_Australasia x
Blockade
Europe x Blockade
Africa x Blockade
America x Blockade
Wald chi-square
statistics
(p-value)
Arellano-Bond
test for zero
autocorrelation
order 1 (p-value)
75.69 (0.000)
5.84 (0.000)

88.04 (0.000)

5.77 (0.000)

(0.0351)***
(0.3810)
(0.2839)
(0.1523)**
(0.1358)
(0.1120)
(0.0758)
(0.0459)**
(0.0388)***
(0.0325)***
(0.0154)***
(0.0315)***
(0.0259)***
(0.0316)
(0.0283)**

(0.0347)**
(0.0450)
(0.0463)***
(0.000)

0.0876
0.0336
0.1638
105.73
5.84 (0.000)

(0.0352)***
(0.3998)
(0.2693)
(0.1473)**
(0.1404)
(0.1110)
(0.0764)
(0.0469)*
(0.0391)***
(0.0335)***
(0.0354)***
(0.0386)
(0.0323)
(0.0366)
(0.0458)
(0.0416)

0.1556
0.0387
0.0411
0.3592
0.0066
0.0131
0.0765
0.0916
0.1711
0.1873
0.3502
0.0587
0.0497
0.0184
0.0318
0.0644
(0.0476)***
(0.4754)
(0.3646)*
(0.2801)
(0.4286)***
(0.2271)
(0.2632)***
(0.0997)***
(0.0910)***
(0.0493)
(0.0282)***

5.32 (0.000)

30.15 (0.000)

0.1762
0.2509
0.6726
0.3652
1.4539
0.3291
0.7503
0.6248
0.6153
0.0694
0.3487

0.1214
0.0660
0.0836
0.3712
0.0008
0.0175
0.0575
0.0989
0.1659
0.1829
0.2775
0.0884
0.0892
0.0351
0.0615

0.1020
0.5034
0.0157
0.3276
0.1384
0.0392
0.1277
0.0829
0.1650
0.1692
0.2754

(0.0402)**
(0.3255)
(0.2759)
(0.1308)**
(0.1278)
(0.1046)
(0.0841)
(0.0447)*
(0.0399)***
(0.0295)***
(0.0153)***

Model H (without
interactions and
regional dummies)

Model F (with regional Model G (with
dummies but without interactions and
interactions)
regional dummies)

Model E (without
interactions and
regional dummies)
(0.0466)***
(0.5054)
(0.0393)*
(0.2776)
(0.4641)***
(0.2279)
(0.2816)***
(0.1023)***
(0.0945)***
(0.0516)
(0.0293)***
(0.0404)**
(0.0344)***
(0.0373)
(0.0462)***

5.21 (0.000)

31.70 (0.000)

0.1839
0.7449
0.6625
0.2858
1.6531
0.2652
0.8709
0.6029
0.6147
0.0798
0.3442
0.0952
0.0958
0.0170
0.1476

(0.0615)
(0.0731)
(0.0935)*
(0.000)

(0.0463)***
(0.5232)
(0.3848)*
(0.2685)
(0.4655)***
(0.2264)
(0.2837)***
(0.1049)***
(0.0955)***
(0.0525)
(0.0516)***
(0.0622)
(0.0398)
(0.0941)
(0.0228)
(0.0752)**

(continued)

5.19 (0.000)

0.0887
0.0846
0.1844
28.35

0.1943
0.6562
0.6969
0.3017
1.6346
0.2575
0.8482
0.6169
0.6235
0.0779
0.4063
0.1022
0.0498
0.0634
0.0228
0.0008

Model I (with regional Model J (with
dummies but without interactions and
interactions)
regional dummies)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist expenditure (ΔlnTE)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist arrivals (ΔlnTA)

Table 4. Empirical analysis of regional dummies and their interaction effects.
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0.43 (0.667)

214.88 (0.974)

43.30 (1.000)

0.44 (0.661)

236.96 (0.855)

44.69 (1.000)

40.18 (1.000)

220.25 (0.932)

0.47 (0.638)

44.40 (1.000)

304.09 (0.034)

0.34 (0.737)

43.11 (1.000)

279.83 (0.157)

0.41 (0.681)

42.42 (1.000)

281.17 (0.108)

0.45 (0.652)

Note: ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. LDV = one-period lagged dependent variable; dlnGDPPC = differenced log gross domestic product per
capita; dlnRPEX = differenced log relative prices standardized by exchange rates; dlnSPEX = differenced log substitute prices standardized by exchange rates; dlnCPR = differenced
log relative corruption perception ranking; Blockade = dummy variable for blockade. Δ denotes the ﬁrst-differenced operator. Number of observations = 549. Number of crosssectional groups = 46. Number of time-series = 10. Coefﬁcients’ standard errors are shown in brackets. The estimation model is system GMM dynamic panel data estimation with
robust standard errors. The estimation procedure follows common correlated effects estimation of heterogeneous dynamic panel models developed by Cuaresmaa et al. (2008).
“Half-panel” jackknife correction is adopted to avoid small sample bias.

ArellanoBond
test for
autocorrelation
order 2
(p-value)
Sargan test of
overidentiﬁcation
restrictions
(p-value)
Hansen test of
overidentiﬁcation
restrictions
(p-value)

Model I (with regional Model J (with
dummies but without interactions and
interactions)
regional dummies)

Model H (without
interactions and
regional dummies)

Model E (without
interactions and
regional dummies)

Model F (with regional Model G (with
dummies but without interactions and
interactions)
regional dummies)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist expenditure (ΔlnTE)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist arrivals (ΔlnTA)

Table 4. (continued)
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(0.2107)***
(0.2068)*
(0.0863)***
(0.0897)*
(0.0627)***
(0.0514)***
(0.0286)
(0.0266)***
(0.0279)***
(0.0153)***

16.12 (0.09)

0.4012
360.41 (0.000)

1.1161
0.3419
0.3469
0.1586
0.2384
0.4243
0.0002
0.1061
0.1475
0.2284

(0.2217)***
(0.2159)
(0.0879)***
(0.0915)*
(0.0640)***
(0.0519)***
(0.0288)
(0.0267)***
(0.0281)***
(0.0153)***
(0.0236)
(0.0205)
(0.0237)
(0.0296)

16.14 (0.0957)

0.4018
358.70 (0.000)

1.1063
0.3454
0.3486
0.1548
0.2333
0.4260
0.0001
0.1066
0.1488
0.2289
0.0001
0.0063
0.0133
0.0038

Model F (with regional
dummies but without
interactions)
(0.2195)***
(0.2136)*
(0.0873)***
(0.0903)*
(0.0634)***
(0.0514)***
(0.0284)
(0.0286)***
(0.0278)***
(0.0340)***
(0.0275)
(0.0245)*
(0.0284)
(0.0359)
(0.0419)**

17.89 (0.2117)

0.4221
387.05 (0.000)

0.1420 (0.0392)***
0.0361 (0.0453)
0.1556 (0.0598)***

1.0857
0.3577
0.3292
0.1527
0.2408
0.4379
0.0015
0.1064
0.1497
0.3214
0.0338
0.0423
0.0011
0.0491
0.1019

Model G (with
interactions and regional
dummies)
(0.3686)***
(0.3617)
(0.1509)
(0.1569)***
(0.1097)
(0.0899)
(0.0500)***
(0.0465)***
(0.0489)
(0.0267)

10.71 (0.3808)

0.3462
284.89 (0.000)

1.3469
0.0964
0.0118
0.7794
0.0689
0.1441
0.4343
0.3435
0.0589
0.2696

Model H (without
interactions and regional
dummies)
(0.3987)***
(0.3775)
(0.1536)
(0.1599)***
(0.1119)
(0.0907)
(0.0503)***
(0.0467)***
(0.0492)
(0.0268)***
(0.0412)
(0.0358)
(0.0415)
(0.0518)

9.98 (0.4419)

0.3476
284.56 (0.000)

1.4114
0.0299
0.0024
0.7884
0.0688
0.1483
0.4326
0.3422
0.0597
0.2698
0.0223
0.0039
0.0058
0.0216

Model I (with regional
dummies but without
interactions)

(0.3884)***
(0.3779)
(0.1545)
(0.1598)***
(0.1121)
(0.0910)
(0.0503)***
(0.0467)***
(0.0491)
(0.0602)***
(0.0486)
(0.0434)
(0.0503)
(0.0634)
(0.0742)

9.55 (0.7945)

0.3545
291.08 (0.000)

0.1181 (0.0694)*
0.0156 (0.0802)
0.1809 (0.1058)*

1.3884
0.0329
0.0228
0.7893
0.0748
0.1384
0.4329
0.3428
0.0600
0.3452
0.0473
0.0367
0.0113
0.0398
0.0747

Model J (with
interactions and regional
dummies)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist expenditure (ΔlnTE)

Note: ***, **, and * denote signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. ΔlnGDPPC = differenced log gross domestic product per capita; ΔlnRPEX = differenced log relative prices
standardized by exchange rates; ΔlnSPEX = differenced log substitute prices standardized by exchange rates; ΔlnCPR = differenced log relative corruption perception ranking; Blockade =
dummy variable for blockade. Δ denotes ﬁrst-difference operator. Number of observations = 549. Number of cross-sectional groups = 46. Number of time-series = 11. Coefﬁcients'
standard errors are shown in brackets. The F-test of overall signiﬁcance examines the joint signiﬁcance of all coefﬁcients. The null hypothesis of the F-test is that all coefﬁcients are not
signiﬁcant. Hausman test analyzes the differences between the ﬁxed-effects and random-effect coefﬁcients. The null hypothesis of Hausman test states that the difference in coefﬁcients is
not systematic. If the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, random-effect model will be chosen. If the null hypothesis is rejected, ﬁxed-effect model will be selected.

ΔlnGDPPCit
ΔlnGDPPCit-1
ΔlnRPEXit
ΔlnRPEXit-1
ΔlnSPEXit
ΔlnSPEXit-1
ΔlnCPRit
ΔlnCPRit-1
Dummy_2016
Blockade
Asia_Australasia
Europe
Africa
America
Asia_Australasia x
Blockade
Europe x Blockade
Africa x Blockade
America x
Blockade
R-squared
F-test of overall
signiﬁcance
(p-value)
Hausman test
(p-value)

Model E (without
interactions and regional
dummies)

Dependent variable: Differenced log tourist arrivals (ΔlnTA)

Table 5. Robustness check of regional dummies and their interaction effects using maximum likelihood estimation of random-effects models.
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Table 6. Tourist arrivals from Asia-Australasia, Europe and America regions, visa free, between 2016 and
2019.
Year

Asia-Australasia

Europe

America

2017
2018
2019

88,963
342,782
292,096

133,875
345,890
418,133

35,317
98,451
129,164

Source: Qatar National Tourism Council.

418,133 in 2019, an increase of 212% (Table 6). Similarly, the number of visa-free travelers from the
Americas rose by 266%, from 35,317 in 2017 to 129,164 in 2019.
The results in Table 4 also illustrate that during the 2017–2019 blockade period, the blockade’s
impact on overall international tourist arrivals was negative, but the effect was less severe for
tourists coming from Europe (0.3502 + 0.0876= 0.2626) and the Americas (0.3502 +
0.1638= 0.1864) than it was for visitors from the Middle East and Africa (0.3502). Moreover,
the negative coefﬁcient of the blockade variable is greater than that of the interaction dummies.
When we set blockade = 1 and Europe = 1, the expected change in the log of tourist arrivals from
Europe was 0.1885 (0.3502 + 0.0497 + 0.0876 = 0.1885). Similarly, the expected change in
the log of tourist arrivals when blockade = 1 and America = 1 was 0.2182 (0.3502 –0.0318 +
0.1638=0.2182). In other words, while there was a decline in average tourist ﬂows from European
and American countries during the blockade, based on the ﬁndings, we can conﬁrm that the adverse
effects of the blockade were mitigated to an extent given the positive interaction terms for the
Americas and Europe. The interaction effects for model J were also very similar to those of model G,
as can be seen in Table 5.
The results conﬁrm the severe effects of the blockade on the demand for Qatari tourism, both in
terms of TA and TE. In other words, the blockade severely damaged Qatari tourism, and even the
gradual growth in visitor numbers from other regions could not fully restore the tourism sector to its
pre-blockade level. Furthermore, the available evidence cannot adequately lead us to conclude that
TMD can signiﬁcantly mitigate the loss in tourist arrivals and revenue during the blockade, mostly
due to the sheer magnitude of the blockade’s effects.
The coefﬁcient for lagged growth in tourist arrivals is negative and signiﬁcant at a 5% level of
signiﬁcance, indicating a catch-up effect where negative growth in tourist arrivals in a previous year
enhances tourist growth numbers for the subsequent year in Qatar. Thus, the estimates conﬁrm the
convergence theory of growth (Cuaresmaa et al., 2008), which also applies to the tourism sector
(Haller et al., 2021). The catch-up effect retains the same sign but with a higher signiﬁcance level for
models E–J, as can be seen in Table 4.
The coefﬁcients for the GDP per capita growth variable show the expected sign, indicating that
higher incomes in a country of origin increase the ability of that country’s people to travel, resulting
in more of them visiting Qatar. The coefﬁcients are not signiﬁcant, however.
On the other hand, a negative sign for relative tourism prices (RPEX) indicates that the higher the
RPEX is, the lower the demand for Qatari tourism will be, and vice versa. Interestingly, in models
E-G, as shown in Tables 4 and 5, the RPEX coefﬁcient is negative and signiﬁcant at a conventional
level only for the current period, suggesting that relative tourism prices for the current year matter
more than those of the previous year. Likewise, the coefﬁcients for changes in substitute prices
(SPEX) are negative but not signiﬁcant. Nevertheless, Qatar’s inbound tourism declines when its
consumer price index is comparatively higher than those of competing destinations because Qatar is
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then seen as an expensive destination compared to its competitors. The negative effect of substitute
prices does not depend on time.
The relative measure of perceived corruption yielded some interesting results: First, the coefﬁcients for relative perceived corruption are negative and signiﬁcant at a conventional level of
signiﬁcance. In other words, a higher level of corruption in the country of origin means more of that
country’s people are attracted to visiting Qatar because it is viewed as a less corrupt nation, and
tourists perhaps believe they are less likely to be “ripped off.” Interestingly, the lagged corruption
coefﬁcient is positive and statistically signiﬁcant, so when Qatar is persistently perceived as being
more corrupt than a country of origin, it actually increases tourism income ﬂows. This ﬁnding is
consistent with that of Saha and Yap (2015), who argued that corruption can favor developing
countries by greasing the wheels of the economy through bribes to help ﬁrms bypass onerous public
policies and thus stimulate the tourism industry. Interestingly, the positive effect of corruption on TE
seems to support the above argument.
The dummy variable for tourism data in 2016 was positive and highly signiﬁcant, indicating that
the average number of tourist arrivals from the 46 considered countries did increase signiﬁcantly
from 2006 and reached a peak in 2016 (see Figure 1). All models pass the test for the absence of AR
(2) in the error term, and the estimates are all robust. Nevertheless, the AR (2) test results suggest
that the models with two lags perform better than those with one lag.

Conclusions and further implications
Theoretical implications
This study has explored the extent to which political sanctions can deleteriously affect a country’s
inbound tourism, even when a government has a tourism market diversiﬁcation policy in place.
Based on the empirical data, we performed interaction analysis to estimate the marginal impact of
TMD on tourism demand during the blockade of Qatar by other GCC countries. In addition, based
on an interaction analysis between the other tourism markets that were not involved in the blockade
of Qatar, as represented by dummy variables in the tourism-demand model, the study found that
these markets could be leveraged to mitigate the harmful effects of the blockade.
The study advances existing knowledge by contributing to the existing literature in three important
ways. First, prior research has estimated how foreign travel restrictions imposed by a destination affect
its own inbound tourism demand. In contrast, this study has investigated the impact of an unfavorable
political event (i.e., the blockade of Qatar) that was instigated by the tourists’ countries of origin (i.e.,
the other GCC countries) on international travel to a destination (i.e., Qatar).
Second, we further studied whether TMD strategies could alleviate the harmful effects of the
blockade on inbound tourism demand using interaction analysis. To the best of our knowledge, this
paper is the ﬁrst effort to explore this research direction. Indeed, modeling and estimating a TMD
strategy and establishing its robustness for alleviating the adverse consequences of a blockade on a
country’s tourism sector is both novel and utilitarian.
The third key contribution of this study is highlighting the effect of environmental hostility on
international tourism and how TMD can potentially offset such hostility. Political sanctions and
blockades create hostile environments for tourism development by portraying the sanctioned country as
a precarious tourism destination. Such events can diminish inbound tourist arrivals and the associated
revenues, especially from the countries imposing the sanctions, and this in turn reduces the quality of life
for the citizens of the target country and creates a challenging business climate for tourism-related
industries. The drop in inbound tourist arrivals and spending means that ﬁrms must compete for the
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business of a lower number of potential customers. Nevertheless, such environments are also often
associated with opportunities for ﬁrms to expand their market share and earn greater proﬁts through
diversiﬁcation and service innovation (Ndubisi et al., 2015). When competition is extremely intense,
organizations typically turn their attention to differentiation strategies where they leverage their unique
competencies, such as service innovation (Ndubisi et al., 2020) and market diversiﬁcation (TMD in the
present case). By considering the theoretical ramiﬁcations of political and environmental hostility, as
well as how TMD can moderate its effect on performance in the tourism sector, this study adds to the
extant literature on tourism economics, environmental hostility and muniﬁcence, and their interfaces.

Managerial and policy implications
The research adopted Qatar as a case study for investigation because the country had been investing
signiﬁcantly in the tourism industry over the last 10 years, but the blockade then raised serious
concerns about the resilience of this industry. This study found that the coefﬁcients for Asia and
Australasia, Europe, and the Americas were positive and statistically signiﬁcant, indicating that
tourist arrivals from these regions increased during the blockade. However, the estimation results
also conﬁrmed the severe adverse effect of the blockade, and changes in the log of tourist arrivals
expectedly declined. Therefore, based on our case study, it is clear that a blockade or political
sanction can severely impact tourism development. Furthermore, using the HI as an indicator of
diversiﬁcation and interacting it with the blockade variable, only two out of four cases showed
positive and signiﬁcant interaction terms. This ﬁnding supports the notion that diversiﬁcation
strategies could successfully mitigate the adverse effects of a blockade on tourism demand. Thus,
managers and government policymakers in countries at risk of blockades, sanctions, and other
hostile geopolitical acts can turn to tourism portfolio diversiﬁcation by targeting travelers from
neutral countries or regions, especially those that may be sympathetic toward the sanctioned nation.
There seems to be a dearth of discussion in practitioner and policy publications on how
geopolitical incidents like sanctions and blockades can lead to losses in tourism revenue, as well as
how managers and policymakers in a target country can respond to such events and ameliorate the
adverse implications for socioeconomic development. Our research suggests some feasible
strategies and tools for practitioners and policymakers to consider. Firstly, this study broadens our
understanding of how an unfavorable geopolitical incident can affect the target country. Secondly, it
provides a holistic view of how such events have negative spillover effects for tourism development.
Thirdly, it suggests that managers and policymakers can use diversiﬁcation as an effective intervention to mitigate this damage.
A blockade or sanction is undeniably detrimental to tourism development in the target country,
but it remains unknown as to whether such incidents damage the long-term bilateral trade relations
between the sanctioning and sanctioned countries. As Kirshner (1997) stressed, when a state designs a
sanction for another country, the cost of imposing it may outweigh the political beneﬁts of the desired
outcome. For instance, Yang et al. (2004) reported that when the US imposed high-tech export
controls and import tariffs on China, these sanctions hurt the US economy more than they did China’s
economy in 2000, causing nearly 1.3 million job losses in the USA but only 461,745 in China.

Future research
In our research, we introduced a HI score for the geographical diversiﬁcation of tourism exports and
used it as a proxy for TMD. Future research could also adopt the HI score to measure the degree of
geographical diversiﬁcation for the tourism markets of other destinations.
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Moreover, this study applied quantitative analysis to predict the detrimental effects of a political
event on international tourism, and it employed interaction analysis to estimate the effects of the
blockade on tourist arrivals from regions that were not directly involved in the event. Future studies
could apply this study’s model to other geopolitical contexts such as the Russia–Ukraine relations,
and other instances of environmental hostility, to assess the consequences for local, regional, and
international tourism performance.
Furthermore, our study is limited in terms of data availability because it is based on a single
country (the target of the blockade). In the existing tourism literature, there seems to be a lack of
research and discussion about how similar political incidents can cause a loss of tourism revenue for
the imposing countries. The research into the interactional impacts of TMD and political events on
tourism demand could be extended to a cross-country analysis by including the blockade or sanction
imposing countries. As such, we recommend that future studies focus on the “reverse effects” of the
blockade on the imposing countries, namely, the other GCC countries.
Ex-post evaluations of both the imposing countries and the blockaded country is also necessary.
The goal of such an investigation would be to evaluate changes in the political, regulatory, sociocultural, and economic ties among the involved nations since the lifting of the blockade, as well
as determine the trajectory for intra-regional tourism after the blockade.
The recent pandemic brought another type of blockade in the form of travel bans and restrictions,
with adverse consequences for local and international tourism. For example, Qatar has grouped
countries into three categories (the exceptional red, the red, and the green zone) based on international and local health risk indicators and the epidemiology of COVID-19 in the different
countries. The unvaccinated tourists from the red and the exceptional red lists are not free to enter
Qatar. Other countries have similar lists and conditions. More recently, Southern African travelers
have been blocked from entering many countries due to the discovery of Omicron variant of
COVID-19. So, pandemic- and other public health-related blockades/bans and the impact on local
and international tourism are interesting future research directions, and it would be interesting to see
how our model performs in such contexts.
Last but not least, there is need for future research on the link between blockade (including in war
times) and UN Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) of Zero Hunger. A classic example is the
1967–1970 Biafra-Nigeria civil war, where Britain and Russia fought on the side of Nigeria. It was
not the combined military assault of the triad, but the food blockade that took more civilian lives
(especially children) in Biafra (for graphic images of the blockaded-induced hunger and starvation,
see https://www.gettyimages.ae/photos/starving-biafran). We recommend a historic research design
for future research in this area. We also propose that more studies investigating other nuances of
environmental hostility, blockade, and political sanction will add value and push back the frontier of
knowledge in the ﬁeld.
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Appendix
Table A1. Countries that grant immediate visas upon arrival to Qatar.
Types of visas

Asia-Australasia

Europe

America

Middle East

Africa

Free tourist –
90 days

Malaysia

Argentina, Antigua
and Barbuda,
Bahamas,
Dominican
Republic

Cyprus

Seychelles,
Malta

Free tourist –
30 days

Australia, India, Japan,
Indonesia, Pakistan,
Brunei
Darussalam,
Thailand, China,
Maldives,
Singapore,
Kazakhstan, South
Korea, New
Zealand, Hong
Kong
Taiwan, Macau

Spain, Estonia,
Portugal,
Denmark,
Sweden, Albania,
Hungary, Austria,
Norway, Greece,
Ukraine, Iceland,
Italy, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Poland,
Turkey, Czech
Republic,
Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia,
Switzerland,
Serbia, France,
Finland, Croatia,
Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg,
Netherland,
Liechtenstein,
Armenia
Azerbaijan, Vatican
City, Andorra,
Ireland, the UK,
Belarus, Georgia,
Russia, San
Marino, Costa
Rica, Macedonia,
Monaco, Bosnia
and Herzegovina

Ecuador, Uruguay,
Brazil, Mexico, the
USA, Paraguay,
Panama, Bolivia,
Peru, Chile,
Suriname,
Venezuela, Canada,
Cuba, Colombia

Lebanon

South
Africa,
Rwanda

Montenegro

Falkland Islands,
French Guiana

Iran

Mauritius

Tourist one-tripinstant

Source: The Department of the Airport Passports, General Directorate of Passports, Ministry of Internal Affairs in Qatar.
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